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Abstract. Electronic Commerce has been a very signiﬁcant commercial phenomenon in recent years, and autonomous agents are
widely adopted by business or individuals in electronic marketplaces to fulﬁll time consuming tasks in trading. Agent negotiation
mechanisms are usually applied between conﬂicted agents in order to reach a mutually beneﬁcial agreement. Prediction of
trading agents’ strategies and behaviours in negotiation is a very signiﬁcant research topic in agent negotiation. By employing
the prediction results on opponents’ possible strategies and behaviours during a negotiation, trading agents can plan and perform
corresponding strategies in order to maximize their own proﬁts. Signiﬁcant achievements have been made on this topic. However,
most existing approaches are based on machine learning mechanisms, which may fail to capture opponents’ behaviours in open
and dynamic electronic marketplaces. In this paper, two agent behaviour expectation approaches are introduced to help trading
agents to capture opponents’ potential behaviours during a negotiation in complex e-marketplaces. (i) The regression analysis
approach focuses on illustrating the main trends of opponents’ trading behaviours; (ii) the vector analysis approach pays more
attention to identifying opponents’ detailed negotiation strategies. The experimental results show the efﬁciency and efﬁcacy of
the two proposed approaches in open and dynamic negotiation environments.
Keywords: Agent negotiation, e-marketplace, agent behaviour prediction

1. Introduction
Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) has been changing traditional methods of business in recent years and
has become a very important commercial phenomenon
[11,14]. Nowadays, many businesses operate in electronic marketplaces (e-markets). By comparison with
traditional marketplaces, e-markets have some obvious
advantages. (1) The e-market provides wider trading
environments to participators than the traditional marketplace. (2) The e-market saves participators’ costs on
physical resources compared with traditional marketplaces. And (3) the e-market provides efﬁcient instruments for communicating and trading between participators. For example, in e-marketplaces, merchants can
save their budgets on business maintenance by avoiding physical shops and shop assistants. Also, shoppers
do not need to visit shops in person which can save
* Corresponding

author.

costs on trafﬁc and time. Moreover, all participators
can collect information about their items of interest
and communicate with potential trading partners in a
timely manner. Participators in an e-market are usually busy in collecting information, selecting trading
partners, comparing similar goods and bargaining with
different trading partners. In order to release participators from these time consuming jobs, autonomous
agents are employed on behalf of traders to fulﬁl trading activities in e-markets. Participators only need
‘tell’ agents about their trading expectations, and then
agents can perform the detailed dealing procedures automatically. However, because agents may have different trading purposes and strategies, conﬂicts may happen when they perform detailed trading behaviours in
an e-market. Negotiation mechanisms are usually applied between conﬂicted agents in order to reach a mutually beneﬁcial agreement among them [21,27,29]. In
Fig. 1, we display an example of agent negotiation. Six
agents (three buyers and three sellers) bargain over is-
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Fig. 1. A 3-to-3 multilateral negotiation.

sues related to purchasing a car. The buyers have different preferences on car models, colors and accessories,
and the sellers concentrate more on proﬁles they can
get. In order to reach an agreement by considering individual expectations, agent negotiation is adopted in
such a situation. The detailed concepts about agent negotiation are introduced in the following paragraph.
Negotiation is a means for agents to communicate
and compromise to reach mutually beneﬁcial agreements [7,16]. However, in most situations, agents do
not have complete information about their partners’
negotiation strategies, and may have difﬁculty in making decisions on future negotiations, such as how to select suitable partners for further negotiation [1,18], or
how to generate a suitable counter-offer in the next negotiation round [20]. Therefore estimation approaches
which can predict uncertain situations and possible
changes in the future are required to help agents generate good and efﬁcient negotiation strategies. Research
on partner behaviour estimation has been a very active
direction in recent years. By employing the expectation results on opponents’ possible strategies and behaviours, self-interested agents can plan and perform
corresponding behaviours during a negotiation in order to maximize their own proﬁts. The literature includes signiﬁcant achievements on this topic [3–5,12,
13,19,23,30,31]. However, most existing approaches
are based on machine learning mechanisms, i.e. the behaviour estimation approaches are well trained by samples in advance. Such mechanisms may perform well
when the negotiation environment and opponents’ behaviours are simple, i.e. the negotiation environment
does not change during the negotiation and opponents
do not modify their negotiation strategies frequently.
However, in a real e-market, participators can enter

into or leave off a marketplace freely. Hence, a negotiation environment may become highly dynamic, and
opponents may modify their negotiation strategies frequently in order to maximize their proﬁts. Therefore,
when the machine learning based approach is used in
real-world applications, some limitations will emerge.
In general, a machine learning based approach comprises two steps in order to properly estimate the
agents’ behaviour. In the ﬁrst step, the proposed estimation function is required to be well trained by training data. Therefore, the performance of the estimation function is somehow decided by the training result. The training data could be both synthetic or collected from the real world. Usually, the synthetic data
are helpful in training a function to enhance its problem solving skill for some particular issues, while the
real world data can help the function to improve its
ability in complex problem solving. After the estimation function is trained, it is employed to predict opponents’ behaviours in the second step. However, no matter how many data are employed to train the estimation
function, the training data may still not be comprehensive enough to cover all situations in reality. Therefore,
it is very likely that the behaviour estimation results
cannot truly reﬂect an opponent’s behaviour which is
not included in the training data. Also, when the negotiation environment becomes more open and dynamic,
agents with different purposes, preferences and negotiation strategies can enter into and leave a negotiation
dynamically. The machine learning based behaviours
estimation approaches may not work well in such an
uncertain situation by considering the limitations of
(1) lacking sufﬁcient data to train the estimation function, and (2) requesting extra trading time.
In this paper, two approaches for agent behaviour
estimation are introduced to solve agent behaviour estimation problems in open and dynamic environments
from different perspectives. The ﬁrst approach is based
on a regression analysis mechanism. By dynamically
analyzing historical offers from an opponent, a power
regression function is generated to ﬁt the opponent’s
behaviour in each negotiation round dynamically and
optimally. Then by analyzing the regression function,
the opponent’s behaviours can be identiﬁed. The estimation on the opponent’s possible behaviour in the following negotiation round is indicated by a conﬁdence
bound. By comparing the difference between the opponent’s behaviour in the historical record and the estimation results, the accuracy level of the regression
function can also be calculated. Based on an agent’s
requirements on the accuracy of estimation results, the
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form of the regression function can also be changed
dynamically during the negotiation. Such a regression
estimation approach is very suitable for handling the
opponent behaviour prediction problem in uncertain
environments, and to identify the main trends of an opponent’s trading behaviour.
The second approach pays more attention to detailed trends of an opponent’s behaviour. According to
the extent of the opponent’s concessions during a negotiation, the opponent’s possible behaviours are preclassiﬁed into several classes. During a negotiation,
because an opponent may apply different strategies to
make concessions in different periods of the negotiation, a vector analysis method is introduced to identify
the opponent’s concession strategies in each negotiation period. Then, based on the opponent’s historical
concession strategies, the possible concession strategy
in the following negotiation round can be estimated.
Compared with the regression approach, this vector
approach will give more detailed information about an
opponent’s behaviour in different negotiation periods.
Agents can get more information about an opponent’s
preferred negotiation strategies and behaviours in different negotiation periods and situations.
By comparison with machine learning mechanisms,
the proposed two approaches only use the historical offers in the current negotiation to estimate an opponent’s
behaviour in future negotiations and do not require any
additional training process. So the proposed approaches are very suitable to work under an open and dynamic negotiation environment, and to make timely credible judgements on an opponent’s behaviour. Also, because the proposed approaches do not make any strict
assumption on an agent’s purpose, preference and negotiation strategy, they can be employed widely in negotiation by different types of agents. Furthermore, the
proposed regression approaches not only represent the
estimation results within bound, but also give the probability that each individual situation may happen in future. Thus an agent can easily have an overview on an
opponent’s possible behaviours, and then modify its
own negotiation strategy based on this information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the power regression approach to
estimate an opponent’s negotiation behaviour. In Section 3, we introduce the vector analysis approach to
show how to predict an opponent’s behaviour. Section 4 introduces an approach to calculate the probability that predicted behaviours may happen in the future. Section 5 discusses the experimental results of the
two proposed estimation approaches, and also a com-
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parison between related approaches. In Section 6, related work on agent behaviour estimation is introduced
and compared with the proposed approaches. Section 7
concludes this paper and suggests future work.

2. Regression analysis
In this section, we introduce a power regression approach to analyse an opponent’s historical offers and to
predict the opponent’s possible negotiation behaviours
in the future.
2.1. Background
In this subsection, we introduce the background
about the proposed power regression function for opponent behaviour estimation in negotiation. The regression analysis employ both mathematics and probability theory, and can estimate the strength of a modeled relationship between one or more dependent and
independent variables. In order to simplify the complexity for the proposed regression analysis approach,
we make the following simple assumption about a negotiation:
The utilities that an agent gains from an opponent in
previous negotiation rounds is a sequence in monotonic ascending order.
The reason behind this assumption is based on the
consideration that a negotiator cannot break its previous promises during a negotiation. Generally, there are
four kinds of behaviour which an agent can perform
in a negotiation, namely Boulware, Linear, Conceder
and Sit-and-Wait [6,8,28].
In Fig. 2, we illustrate these four common agent behaviours. Let the x-axis indicate the negotiation round
and the y-axis represents the concession that an agent
can make in a negotiation. Details of the four common
negotiation strategies are as follows:
– Boulware: the rate of change in the slope is increasing, corresponding to smaller concessions in
the early stage of a negotiation, but large concessions in the later stage of the negotiation.
– Linear: the rate of change in the slope is zero, corresponding to a constant concession throughout a
negotiation.
– Conceder: the rate of change in the slope is decreasing, corresponding to large concessions in
the early stage of a negotiation, but smaller concessions in the later stage of the negotiation.
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2.2. Regression analysis on partners’ behaviours
In this subsection, we introduce a power regression
analysis approach on a negotiation between two negotiators. Firstly, we perform the following equivalence
transformation on Eq. (1):
ln(U (t)) = ln(a × tb )
= ln(a) + b × ln(t)
∗

∗

(2)
∗

Then let U (t) = ln(U (t)), a = ln(a) and t =
ln(t), Eq. (2) can be rewritten as:
U (t)∗ = a∗ + b × t∗
Fig. 2. Four common strategies in agent negotiation.

– Sit-and-Wait: the rate of change of the slope and
the slope itself are always zero, corresponding to
not making any concession throughout a negotiation.
Since the curves of an agent’s possible behaviours
illustrated in Fig. 2 are monotonic, we introduce a
power regression function to predict an agent’s behaviour in single-issue bilateral negotiation as follows:
U (t) = a × tb

(1)

where U (t) is the utility gained from an opponent at
round t (0  t  τ , τ is the agent negotiation deadline), and both a and b (a  0, b  0) are independent
of t. It is noticed that the four negotiation strategies can
be represented by Eq. (1) with different b values:
– Boulware: when b > 1, the rate of change in the
slope is decreasing, corresponding to smaller concessions in the early stage but large concession in
later cycles.
– Linear: when b = 1, the rate of change in the
slope is zero, corresponding to a constant concession throughout a negotiation.
– Conceder: when 0 < b < 1, the rate of change
in the slope is increasing, corresponding to large
concessions in the early stage but smaller concession in the later stage.
– Sit-and-Wait: when b = 0, the rate of change
of the slope and the slope itself are always zero,
corresponding to not making any concession
throughout a negotiation.
In the following subsection, we will introduce the
proposed power regression function to analyze and estimate possible opponent behaviours.

(3)

The new function indicates a linear relationship between the variables t∗ and U (t)∗ . Both coefﬁcients a∗
and b are independent of t∗ . Let ût be the real utility
that an agent gained from an opponent at round t. The
difference between the agent’s real gained utility (ût )
and the expected utility U (t)∗ can be expressed by the
formula ε(t) = ût − a∗ + b × t∗ . It is assumed that the
distribution of ε(t) obeys the Gaussian distribution, i.e.
ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ).
Let pairs {(ti , ûi )} (i ∈ [0, n]) be the historical
records of an agent’s utilities in the previous n rounds
in the current negotiation, where ti (ti < ti+1 ) indicates the ith negotiation round, and ûi (ûi  ûi+1 )
indicates the real utility that the agent gained from the
opponent. Firstly, we transform all pairs of (ti , ûi ) to
(t∗i , û∗i ) as follows.


t∗i = ln(ti )
û∗i = ln(ui )

(4)

Because û∗i = U (t)∗ + εi , where εi is the estimation error in round i and the distribution of all εi obeys
N (0, σ 2 ), so the joint probability density function for
U (t)∗ is:


n

1
1
√ exp − 2 (û∗i − U (t)∗ )2
L=
2σ
σ 2π
i=1


1
1
√ exp − 2 (û∗i − a∗ − bt∗i )2
2σ
σ 2π
i=1


n
n
1
1
√
=
exp − 2
(û∗ − a∗ − bt∗i )2
2σ i=1 i
σ 2π

=

n


(5)
Because the purpose of this regression approach
is to ﬁnd a function U (t)∗ to ﬁt all real utilities

F. Ren et al. / Expectation of trading agent behaviour in negotiation of electronic marketplace

53

optimally, so the joint probability density function
for U (t)∗ should be maximized. In order to make L
n
achieve its maximum, obviously i=1 (û∗i −a∗ −bt∗i )2
should achieve its minimum value. Let Q(a∗ , b) =
n
∗
∗
∗ 2
i=1 (ûi −a −bti ) , we calculate the ﬁrst-order partial derivative for Q(a∗ , b) on both a∗ and b, and let the
results equal zero, which are shown as follows:
⎧
n
∂Q
⎪
⎪
=
−2
(û∗i − a∗ − bt∗i ) = 0
⎪
⎨ ∂a∗
i=1
n
⎪
∂Q
⎪
⎪
= −2
(û∗i − a∗ − bt∗i )t∗i = 0
⎩
∂b
i=1

(6)

then,
 n 
⎧
n
⎪
⎪
∗
∗
⎪
+
t
û∗i
b
=
na
⎪
i
⎨
 n i=1  n i=1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
t∗i a∗ +
t∗2
b=
i
⎩
i=1







Fig. 3. Estimation of agent’s negotiation behaviour by using regression analysis.

(7)

n

t∗i û∗i

i=1

i=1

U (t) = exp(a∗ ) × tb

Because Eq. (7)’s coefﬁcient matrix is:

 n 2
n
n
∗ 
n
i=1 ti 
∗2
ti −
t∗i
=n
n
n
∗
∗2 
t
t
i=1 i
i=1 i
i=1

i=1

n

(t∗i − t)2 = 0

=n

and ﬁnally let a = exp(a∗ ), then the prediction function is:

(8)

(12)

In Fig. 3, we illustrate an example of the regression
analysis. A power regression curve is generated to optimally ﬁt all historical offers from an opponent. Also,
the conﬁdence area of the regression curve is displayed
between ±3σ (see Section 4 for details).

i=1

So coefﬁcients a∗ and b have a unique solution as
follows:
⎧
n
n
n
n i=1 t∗i û∗i − ( i=1 t∗i )( i=1 u∗i )
⎪
⎪
b=
n
n
⎪
∗2
∗
⎨
n i=1 ti − ( i=1 ti )2
(9)
n
n
⎪
1
b
⎪
∗
∗
∗
⎪
a
=
û
−
t
⎩
n i=1 i
n i=1 i
In order to simplify the solution, let
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨Sxx =
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩Sxy =

n

t∗2
i
i=1
n

1
−
n



1
t∗i û∗i −
n
i=1

2

n

t∗i
i=1

n



i=1



n

t∗i

(10)

û∗i
i=1

then a∗ and b are represented as:
⎧
Sxy
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨b = Sxx
 n 
n
1
1
⎪
∗
⎪
û −
t∗ b
⎪a ∗ =
⎩
n i=1 i
n i=1 i

3. Vector analysis
In this section, we introduce a vector analysis approach to predict an opponent’s behaviour during a negotiation. The prediction is still only based on historical offers of the current negotiation. The vector analysis approach has three major steps. Firstly, the historical records of previous offers are classiﬁed according to the difference between each pair of historical offers. Secondly, offers in the same class are regressed
by adopting a linear function. Thirdly, results of different linear regression functions are combined to generate the ﬁnal prediction result. The detailed procedure
of the three steps is introduced in the following subsections.
3.1. Classiﬁcation

(11)

In this subsection, we introduce a vector classiﬁcation approach to classify historical offers according to
the difference between each two historical offers. Let
pairs {(ti , ûi )} (i ∈ [0, n]) be the historical records
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Fig. 5. Classify point p1 by using vector classiﬁcation.

Fig. 4. An example of two-issue negotiation.

of an opponent’s offers in the previous n rounds in the
current negotiation, where ti (ti < ti+1 ) indicates the
ith negotiation round and ûi (ûi ∈ [0, 1]) indicates
the real utility that the agent gained from the opponent
during round ti . One possible case of two agent twoissue negotiation is illustrated in Fig. 4, where the xaxis indicates the negotiation round, and the y-axis indicates the utility. The lines marked by triangles is the
negotiation on Issue 1, the lines marked by asterisks
is the negotiation on Issue 2, and the lines marked by
circles is the negotiation by considering both issues.
Each point in the graph indicates an offer. The graph
shows all offers from two agents in the ﬁrst six rounds.
It can be seen that agents may have different strategies
to make concessions for different issues and/or in different periods of a negotiation. So according to how
fast an agent gives a concession – the slope of the line
between two points – the agent’s historical offers can
be classiﬁed.
The basic idea of the vector clustering is to classify
offers according to the slope of the line between each
pairwise in the data collection. So, the offers in the same cluster will have a similar concession rate. Firstly,
degrees of lines between one offer and all other offers
is calculated. The dominant degree will be the cluster
which this offer should belong to. By repeating this
process to all historical offers, each offer can be classiﬁed into a particular cluster. The detailed procedure
of the vector classiﬁcation is listed in Algorithm 1.
An example of the vector classiﬁcation is displayed
in Fig. 5. In this example, 11 points are going to be
classiﬁed into a maximum of 18 classes (10◦ for each
class). Taking point p1 as an instance, by calculating the slope of lines between the point p1 and other

Algorithm 1 Vector classiﬁcation
Input: The set O = {(ti , ûi )|(i ∈ [0, N ])} contains an opponent’s historical offers in the pervious
N rounds and the maximal number of class cN um.
Output: Non-empty classes in the form of
{cm |m = 1 . . . cN um} and each cm = {(t, û)}.

cN um
For all classes, cm m=n cn = ∅ and m=1 ci =
O.
Initialization: Initialize all {cm |m = 1 . . . cN um}
to ∅.
for each point (ti , ûi ) in the set O do
initialize all {tempCij |j = 0 . . . N, j = i} to 0
for each point (tj , ûj ) in the set O do
if i equals j then
go to the next round
end if
u −u
degree ← arctan( tjj −tii )
if degree<0 then
degree ← degree + 180◦
end if
um
j ← degree×cN
180◦
j
tempCi ← tempCij + 1
end for
set m to the greatest value in {tempCij |j =
0 . . . N, j = i}
add point (ti , ûi ) to the class cm
end for
return all non-empty in {cm |m = 1 . . . cN um}
points, it is found that the degrees of angles between
the point p1 and points p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, and p11 are
in the range [35◦ , 45◦ ]. The degrees of angles between
the point p1 and points p2 and p3 are in the range
[135◦ , 145◦ ]. The degrees of angles between the point
p1 and points p4 and p5 are in the range [125◦ , 135◦ ].
Since the dominating angles between p1 and other
points are in the range [35◦ , 45◦ ]. So point p1 is clas-
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siﬁed as the 40◦ class. By repeating such a process, all
points are ﬁnally classiﬁed into two classes as shown
in Fig. 5, i.e. points p2, p3, p4 and p5 belong to 0◦
class, and other points belong to 40◦ class.
Because offers in the same cluster will distribute
along a straight line, then in the next section, a linear
regression approach will be employed to identify patterns in each cluster with one or more linear regression
functions.
3.2. Multiple linear regression
In the previous subsection, we introduced a vector
classiﬁcation approach to classify historical offers in
negotiation according to their slopes, i.e., how much
concession an agent would like to make at a certain
moment of a negotiation. After the classiﬁcation, historical offers in the same class have similar slopes and
we can simply adopt a linear regression approach to
analyzing each class. Now replacing U (t)∗ by U (t) =
b×t+a, û∗i by ûi , and t∗i by ti in Eq. (5), we can easily
ﬁnd the parameters a and b to optimally ﬁt all offers
in the same class by the function U (t) = b × t + a.
The two coefﬁcients a and b are calculated as follows.
⎧
M
⎪
⎨a = a
M
(13)
⎪
⎩ b = Mb
M
where




Ma = 




n

i=1 ti 

n
∗
i=1 (ti · ûi )
n
∗
i=1 ûi

n

n

n

i=1

n

n

and




M=


t2i −
i=1

n

i=1



n
ti
i=1




2

n

t2i −

(ti · û∗i ) (15)

ti ·

n

i=1 ti 



n

i=1



i=1

n
2
i=1 ti
n
i=1 ti

=n·

i=1

n

û∗i ·
i=1

(14)

n
∗ 
i=1 (ti · ûi ) 

n
∗

i=1 ûi

n
2
i=1 ti
n
i=1 ti

=

û∗i ,

ti ·

i=1




Mb = 


n

(ti − ti )2

=n
i=1

= 0

(16)

where ti is the average of all ti , and the detailed procedure to calculate the parameters a and b can be found
in Section 2.
By applying coefﬁcients a and b, the pattern in cluster ci can be represented. Even though the estimated
regression function U (t) can guarantee minimal errors
in the cluster Ci , we still do not know the value of
such a minimal error and do not have to double-check
whether this minimal error satisﬁes an agent’s speciﬁcation or not. So we calculate the standard deviation of
distances between historical offers and estimated offers in the cluster Ci as follows:

σe =

ti ,û∗
i

e2ti ,û∗

|Ci |

i

(17)

where |Ci | indicates the size of cluster Ci , and eti ,û∗i
indicates the distance between the real offer (ti , û∗i )
to the regression line U (t), and eti ,û∗i is calculated as
follows:
eti ,û∗i =

a · ti − û∗i + b
√
a2 + 1

(18)

If the standard deviation σe is smaller than a predeﬁned threshold, the regression function U (t) will be
considered as valid. Otherwise, the regression function
U (t) will be considered invalid, and the set Ci will be
divided into two subsets Cip and Ciq as follows:


n

(ti · û∗i ) −

=n·
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Cip = {(ti , û∗i ) | if eti ,û∗i  0}
Ciq = {(ti , û∗i ) | if eti ,û∗i < 0}

(19)

Then for each subsection, a linear regression function can be generated by re-employing the process introduced in this section. This procedure is repeated until the distance between all historical offers and the
corresponding regression function are smaller than the
predeﬁned threshold.
3.3. Combination of regression lines
In the previous subsection, we introduced the approach to generate multiple regression lines in each
cluster of the historical offers, so the domain area of
these regression lines may be overlapped. However,
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during the negotiation, for a certain negotiation round,
only one offer will be generated by an agent and is sent
to opponents. So we need an approach to combine results from different regression functions together.
Let {U (t)i |i = 1 . . . cn} denote all linear regression
lines, where cn is the total number of classes. Each
U (t)i represents one pattern in a cluster in the format
as follows:
U (t)i = bi × t + ai

t ∈ [timin , timax ]

(20)


U (t )i , if t ∈ [timin , timax ]

ut = avg

n
i=1 (di

σ=

− d)2

n

(23)

where,
1
n

n

di

(24)

i=1

Then by employing Chebyshev’s inequality, we can
calculate (i) the interval of an opponent’s behaviour
according to any accuracy requirements; and (ii) the
probability that any particular behaviour may be performed by the opponent in the future. The Chebyshev
inequality is given by:

(21)

i=1

P (|X − μ|  ε) 

4. Probability estimation
In the previous two sections, we proposed a power
regression approach and a vector approach to predict
an opponent’s behaviour. However, it has to be mentioned that both of the proposed approaches can only
provide an estimation on an opponent’s possible behaviour, which might not exactly accord with the opponent’s real behaviours. In this paper, we make an assumption that the differences (ε) between the estimation behaviours and the real behaviours obey the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ 2 ). The reason for such an assumption is because most estimated behaviours are located around the real behaviours. Thus, if the deviation
σ 2 can be calculated, we can make a precise decision
on the range of partner behaviours. It is known that
there is more than 99% likelihood that an opponent’s
behaviours are located in the interval [u − 3σ, u + 3σ].
In this section, we introduce the proposed way to calculate the deviation σ and to estimate the probability
that an opponent’s behaviour may happen in the future.
In order to calculate the deviation σ, we ﬁrstly calculate the distance between the estimation results (ui )
on an opponent’s offer and the real offer from historical records (ûi ) by Eq. (22):
di = ûi − ui



d=

where timin and timax deﬁnes the domain area of the
function U (t)i . Finally, the estimation of agents’ behaviour in the negotiation round t can be calculated
by using Eq. (21):
 cn

by Eq. (23):

(22)

It is assumed that all di (i ∈ [1, n]) obey the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ 2 ). Then σ can be calculated

σ2
ε2

(25)

where X is an instance, μ is the mathematical expectation, σ is the deviation, and ε is the accuracy requirement.
Equation (25) indicates the probability, that the distance from a real offer û∗i to the estimated offer ui is
2
shorter than the distance di , and is greater than σε2 . So
the probability that the opponent will generate a new
2
offer within [μ − di , μ + di ] in the future is 1 − σε2 .
By employing Eqs. (12) and (25), agents can estimate an opponent’s possible negotiation behaviours in
advance, and plan a suitable strategy as a response.
However, such a regression function can only illustrate
the main trend of opponents’ behaviours, it cannot give
accurate information on how opponents change their
negotiation behaviours in each negotiation round.

5. Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate experiments to test
the proposed agent behaviour estimation approaches.
We compare the proposed approaches with the Tit-ForTat approach [6] and illustrate the experimental results.
5.1. Experimental setup
Experiments are set up as follows. In each experiment, two agents are involved, one is the buyer and
the other one is the seller. The two agents negotiate
over a single issue and both of them employ the NDF
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[8] negotiation strategy. Rubinstein’s alternating offers
protocol [24] is employed as the negotiation protocol.
The negotiation deadline is 20 rounds. Agents’ utilities are normalized between 0 and 1. During the negotiation, in order to mimic an open and dynamic negotiation environment, the seller can randomly modify its negotiation strategy, and the buyer will employ
the proposed behaviour estimation approaches to predict the seller’s possible behaviour in the next round.
We repeat the experiment 1000 times. Both agents’ initial negotiation strategies are chosen randomly. In the
following subsection, we ﬁrstly illustrate the experimental results in three typical scenarios, i.e. when the
seller adopts three typical negotiation strategies (conceder, linear and boulware), respectively. Then we illustrate an experimental result by allowing the seller
agent to modify its negotiation strategy randomly. Finally we summarize all experimental results and give
the statistical results over 1000 tests. The estimation
result is evaluated by the mean and standard deviation
(std ) over the differences between the estimated offers
and the real offers in all negotiation rounds. The mean
and the std are calculated as follows:

where di is the difference between the estimated offer
ui and the real offer ûi at the ith negotiation round.
T
i=1

di

(26)

T

and

std =

Fig. 6. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negotiation strategy is linear.
Table 1
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is linear
Function

Domain

U (t) = 0.05 × t1

[1, 20]

Table 2
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
linear

di = |ui − ûi |

mean =

57

T
i=1 (di

− mean)2
T

Index

Function

Domain

1
2
3

U (t) = 0.039 × t + 0.009
U (t) = 0.012 × t + 0.442
U (t) = 0.044 × t + 0.182

[1, 12]
[9, 14]
[10, 20]

4

U (t) = 0.032 × t + 0.314

[16, 18]

Table 3
Comparison of three estimation results when the negotiation
strategy is linear

(27)

where T is the total number of negotiation rounds.
5.2. Scenario 1
In the ﬁrst scenario, the seller agent adopts the linear negotiation strategy. The estimation results by employing different approaches are illustrated in Fig. 6.
It can be seen that the power regression line indicates
the main trend of the seller’s behaviour very well, but
is not accurate enough to describe the details for a
certain moment. The Tit-For-Tat approach indicates
behaviour change at a certain moment, but has too
much error. The vector analysis approach can combine
the advantages of the two approaches. In Fig. 6, we

Approach

Mean

Std

TitForTat
Power Regression

0.079
0.029

0.057
0.02

Vector Analysis

0.024

0.015

draw ±3 standard deviation lines to illustrate the 95%
conﬁdence range. Both power regression and vector
analysis results are within the 95% conﬁdence area,
but some estimation results from Tit-For-Tat are out
of this range. In Tables 1 and 2, we list the regression functions for both proposed approaches, respectively. The statistical evaluations on the three estimation approaches by using Eqs. (26) and (27) are listed
in Table 3. The statistical results indicate that the vector analysis approach outperforms the other two approaches.
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Table 4
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is boulware
Function

Domain

U (t) = 0.003 × t1.98

[1, 20]

Table 5
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
boulware
Index

Function

Domain

1
2
3

U (t) = 0.025 × t + 0.027
U (t) = 0.03 × t − 0.017
U (t) = 0.023 × t + 0.133

[1, 11]
[3, 10]
[12, 14]

4
5

U (t) = 0.048 × t − 0.045
U (t) = 0.068 × t − 0.422

[15, 20]
[16, 17]

Fig. 7. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negotiation strategy is boulware.

5.3. Scenario 2
In the second scenario, the seller agent employs
the boulware negotiation strategy, which gives smaller
concessions at the early stages of the negotiation and
greater concessions at the later stages. It can be seen
in Fig. 7 that the power regression function displays
the main trend of the opponent’s behaviour correctly.
However, when the real offers from the opponent exhibit little ﬂuctuation, the power regression function
cannot identify such a change. By comparison with the
power regression function, the Tit-For-Tat approach
goes to the other extreme estimation result, i.e. when
the real offers ﬂuctuate, the Tit-For-Tat approach can
notice such a change and give immediate responses.
However, according to the experimental results, the
Tit-For-Tat approach usually made a strong attempt to
respond to changes in the real offers. For example, in
the 10th , 12th and 15th negotiation rounds, the estimation results from the Tit-For-Tat approach are outside the ±3 standard deviation area. So such estimation results can be considered as invalid. The vector
analysis approach can improve the estimation performance based on both the power regression approach
and the Tit-For-Tat approach. According to the experimental results, not only can the vector analysis approach follow the main trend of the historical offers,
but also properly indicate the ﬂuctuations of the historical offers. Compared to the invalid estimation results
generated by the Tit-For-Tat approach, the estimation
results generated by the vector analysis approach in
these rounds ﬁt the historical offers very well. In Tables 4 and 5, we list the regression functions for both
power regression analysis and vector analysis. Table 6

Table 6
Comparison of three estimation results when the negotiation
strategy is boulware
Approach

Mean

Std

TitForTat
Power Regression
Vector Analysis

0.062
0.027
0.03

0.051
0.027
0.02

displays the statistical results to evaluate the accuracy
of the three estimation approaches. It can be seen that,
again, the vector analysis outperforms the other two
approaches.
5.4. Scenario 3
In the third scenario, the seller agent employs the
conceder negotiation strategy. According to the power
regression function in Table 7, it can be seen that
the power regression analysis successfully identiﬁes
the seller agent’s negotiation strategy. In Fig. 8, it
can be seen that the estimation results generated by
the vector analysis approach ﬁt the historical offers
properly, except in the 16th negotiation round. The
regression functions for vector analysis are listed in
Table 8. The Tit-For-Tat approach does not perform
well in this experiment. Almost 50% of the estimation results do not ﬁt the historical offers, and ﬁve
(25%) estimation results even reside outside the ±3
standard deviation area. The statistic evaluations on
the three estimation approaches are listed in Table 9.
It can be seen that the power regression approach
achieves a similar result as the vector analysis approach, but the Tit-For-Tat approach does not perform
well.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negotiation strategy is conceder.

Fig. 9. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negotiation strategy is dynamically modiﬁed.

Table 7
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is conceder

Table 10
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is dynamically modiﬁed

Function

Domain

Function

Domain

U (t) = 0.123 × t0.7

[1, 20]

U (t) = 0.152 × t1.5

[1, 20]

Table 8
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
conceder

Table 11
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
dynamically modiﬁed

Index

Function

Domain

Index

Function

Domain

1
2

U (t) = 0.045 × t + 0.152
U (t) = 0.032 × t + 0.273

[1, 5]
[6, 13]

1
2

U (t) = 0.002 × t + 0.01
U (t) = 0.032 × t + 0.246

[1, 3]
[4, 15]

3
4

U (t) = 0.032 × t + 0.32
U (t) = 0.022 × t + 0.562

[7, 9]
[14, 20]

3
4
5
6

U (t) = 0.023 × t + 0.066
U (t) = 0.063 × t + 0.064
U (t) = 0.038 × t + 0.14
U (t) = 0.023 × t + 0.557

[6, 9]
[7, 14]
[10, 16]
[17, 20]

Table 9
Comparison of three estimation results when the negotiation
strategy is conceder
Approach

Mean

Std

TitForTat
Power Regression
Vector Analysis

0.06
0.027
0.023

0.04
0.02
0.02

5.5. Scenario 4
In the fourth scenario, the seller agent is allowed
to modify its negotiation strategy randomly during the
negotiation. The experimental results are illustrated in
Fig. 9. It can be seen that the seller agent’s offer ﬂuctuates greatly and frequently. For the estimation results
generated by employing the Tit-For-Tat approach, 25%
of estimation results are located out of the ±3σ conﬁdence area. As displayed in Table 12, the average er-

ror of Tit-For-Tat in this case is almost 0.4, and the
standard deviation is around 0.57. These values indicate that the estimated results generated by the Tit-ForTat approach are very unstable and inaccurate when
agents modify their negotiation strategy randomly. By
Comparison, the power regression approach generates
a better result. The power regression function is listed
in Table 10. According to Table 12, because the standard deviation of errors in estimated results is around
0.14, so almost all results are located inside the ±2σ
conﬁdent area. Again, the vector approach provides
best estimation results among them in this case. It can
be seen that the regression lines generated by the vector method follow the real instances much better than
the other approaches. Nearly 50% of estimated offer
are located on the real offers. As shown in Table 12,
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Table 12
Comparison of three estimation results when the negotiation
strategy is dynamically modiﬁed

Approach

Mean

Std

TitForTat
Power Regression
Vector Analysis

0.392
0.181
0.104

0.578
0.141
0.102

Table 13
Comparison of three estimation results by considering three
negotiation strategies
Approach

Mean

Std

TitForTat
Power Regression

0.551
0.097

2.138
0.067

Vector Analysis

0.074

0.05

both the average error and the standard deviation of the
vector approach are only around 0.1.
5.6. Summary
In order to have a comprehensive comparison between these three estimation approaches, we repeat the
experiment 1000 times. The seller agent is allowed
to adopt different negotiation strategies randomly. The
statistical evaluation results over the 1000 experiments
are displayed in Table 13. It can be seen that on average, the vector analysis approach achieves the best estimation performance, which has 0.074 error in average and 0.05 in the standard deviation of errors. The
result from the power regression approach is also acceptable, which is 0.097 error in average and 0.067
in the standard deviation of errors. However, the performance of the Tit-For-Tat approach is not satisﬁed.
The average error of the Tit-For-Tat approach is almost eight times greater than the vector approach. In
summary, it is found that the vector analysis approach
can provide the best results in an opponent’s behaviour
prediction.
6. Related work
In this section, we introduce some related works. In
[22], we proposed a regression-based model to estimate negotiation opponents’ behaviour. However, the
regression-based approach is good at indicating opponents’ main trend on negotiation strategy, but may not
sensitive enough to catch opponents’ changes on bidding in each negotiation round. Therefore, we introduce a vector-based estimation approach as a supplement of regression-based model in this paper.

In [25], Schapire et al. proposed a machine learning
approach based on a boosting algorithm. Initially, the
estimation problem is reduced to a classiﬁcation problem. All training data are arranged in ascending order
and then partitioned into groups equally. For each of
the breakpoints, a learning algorithm is employed to
estimate the probability that a new bid at least should
be greater than the breakpoint. The ﬁnal result of this
learning approach is a function which gives minimal
error rate between the estimated bid and the real one.
Based on this function, agent behaviours can be estimated. However, the accuracy of this approach is limited by the training data and classiﬁcation approach. So
applications based on this approach can hardly achieve
a satisfactory level when negotiations happen in an
open and dynamic environment.
In [10], Gal and Pfeffer presented another machine learning approach based on a statistical method.
The proposed approach is ﬁrstly trained by agent behaviours according to their types. Then for an unknown agent, it will be classiﬁed into a known kind
of agent according to their similarities. Finally, based
on these probabilities, the unknown agent behaviour is
estimated by combining all known agent behaviours.
The limitation of this approach is that, in reality, it is
impossible to train a system with all different types of
agents. Therefore if an unknown agent belongs to a
type which is excluded from the system, the estimation
result may not reach an acceptable accuracy level.
Chajewska et al. [3] proposed a decision-tree approach to learn and estimate an agent’s utility function. The authors assumed that each agent is rational
and looks for maximum expected utility in negotiation.
Firstly, a decision tree is established which contains
all possible endings for the negotiation. Each possible
ending is assigned a particular utility value and possibility. Based on the partner’s previous decisions on
the decision tree, a linear function can be generated
analogous to the partner’s utility function, and each
item in the function comes from an internal node in
the decision tree. The limitation of this approach is the
requirement that all possible negotiation endings and
the corresponding probabilities should be estimated in
advance, which is impossible in some application domains when the variance of negotiation issues is discrete or the negotiation environment is open and dynamic.
Brzostowski and Kowalczyk [2] presented a way to
estimate partners’ behaviours based only on the historical offers in the current negotiation. In the ﬁrst
place, partner types are estimated based on the given
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functions. For each type of agent, a distinct prediction
function is given to estimate agent behaviours. Therefore, based on the classiﬁcation of partner types and
their individual estimation functions, the proposed approach can predict partner behaviours in the next negotiation cycle. However, a partner can only perform
as a time-dependent agent or a behaviour-dependent
agent, which limits some applications. Also the accuracy of classiﬁcation on partner types may impact the
accuracy of prediction results.
Hindriks and Tykhonov [15] proposed a generic
framework based on a Bayesian model to learn opponent negotiation behaviour in multiple issue negotiation. The purpose of this framework is to learn both the
opponent’s negotiation preference and the utility function. The opponent’s preference is estimated based on
an assumption that the opponent will make a greater
concession on a less-valued issue and a smaller concession on a more-valued issue. Through comparing
the opponent’s concessions for each issue, the opponent’s preference can be estimated. In order to learn
the opponent’s utility function, three basic functions
are proposed. The opponent’s utility function is ﬁnally represented as a combination of the three possible functions. By using the estimated preference and
utility function, an agent can efﬁciently search for an
optimal negotiation outcome. However, this approach
can only generate a satisfying result when the opponent performs a relatively simple behaviour. If the opponent’s behaviour becomes complex and changeful, it
will not be estimated easily and an optimal negotiation
outcome may not be reached effectively.
Maheswaran et al. [17] proposed a Criticality-Sensitive Coordination (CSC) system to handle coordination problems in complex environments. In a dynamic,
uncertain and nonlinear environment, agents may only
have partial knowledge of the team reward function,
and cannot accurately choose the optimal policy to
maximize the global reward. In order to avoid harming the current policy when an agent changes its policy, a Predictability and Criticality Metrics (PCM) is
proposed, where the predictability limits the policy
modiﬁcation within an acceptable area, and criticality metrics evaluate a potential policy modiﬁcation by
considering the nonlinear effect. By combining these
two processes, even though it cannot guarantee that
a global maximal team reward can be reached, it can
avoid great damage on the team reward. This approach
can be applied on a coordination system where stability is the primary consideration. However, since this
approach does not pay attention to searching for the
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optimal policy, the performance of this approach may
not be conspicuous by considering the global team reward.
In [9], Fatima et al. studied bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents whose utility
functions are nonlinear. The authors argued that even
though the package deal procedure leads multiple negotiation to Pareto optimality, computing the equilibrium for the package deal procedure is not always
easy, especially for non-linear utility functions. In order solve such a problem, the authors introduced two
approaches: (1) to approximate non-linear utility functions by linear functions; and (2) to use the simultaneous procedure to negotiate issues in parallel but
independently. By employing these two approaches,
approximate equilibrium will be found in polynomial
time. This paper also showed that although the package deal procedure is known to generate Pareto optimal outcomes, the simultaneous procedure may outperform in some cases by considering economic properties. However, the ﬁrst approach may fail to reach an
optimal outcome when an approximate line is hard to
ﬁnd, and the second approach may fail to reach an optimal outcome when the negotiated issues are not absolutely independent.
In [26], Schvartzman and Wellman proposed a general approach to automatically search for equilibrium
strategies in negotiation through reinforcement learning, and applied this methodology to continuous double auction game. During the game, a new bidding
strategy will be generated by using reinforcement
learning, and tested by negotiators. If the new proposed bidding strategy can improve the reinforcement
learning model, then it will be accepted as a potential
bidding strategy, otherwise, it will be discarded by the
agent. The process will complete when no further improvement can be made on the reinforcement learning
model. The major difference between this paper and
our work is that we pay more attention to estimate opponents’ bidding behaviours and to modify agents’ existing negotiation strategy, but not focus on generating
different bidding strategies.
By comparing our approach with the above opponent behaviour estimation approaches, our proposed
approach has two attractive merits. (1) The proposed
approach does not need any training or preparation in
advance, and it can estimate an opponent’s behaviour
based only on the current historical records and generate reasonable estimation results in a timely manner.
So, an agent can save its time, and increase the negotiation efﬁciency by employing the proposed approach;
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and (2) the proposed approach estimates an opponent’s
behaviour according to the probability that each particular behaviour will happen in the future. So an agent
can adopt the estimation results as well as the corresponding probabilities to guide its own negotiation behaviours efﬁciently in the future.

7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a regression approach
and a vector approach to estimate an opponent’s negotiation behaviours. The regression approach is good
at indicating the main trend of an opponent’s negotiation behaviour, and the vector approach is sensitive
to changes on an opponent’s behaviour. The proposed
approaches do not require any prior training process,
and can also indicate the likelihood of each estimated
result. The experimental results indicate the efﬁcacy
and efﬁciency of the proposed approach by comparison with the Tit-For-Tat approach.
Future work on this research will focus on two directions. (1) To extend the proposed approach from
single-issue to multi-issue negotiation, and (2) to extend the proposed approach from bilateral to multilateral negotiation.
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